The Dogmata of Secrecy: Are we Realistic about the Facts and Impact of Massive Leaks of Classified Information?

C.N.J. de VeyMestdagh1 c.n.j.de.vey.mestdagh [at] law-and-ict.org
A. Kamphorst2
J. H. Noordhoek2
T. Mulder2
H. T. van der Waaij2
  1. Centre for Law&ICT, University of Groningen, THE NETHERLANDS
  2. Law&ICT and European and International Law at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands.
Abstract 

In recent years, massive leaks of classified information enabled by the Internet have been at the core of political andmedia attention. Wikileaks and the Snowden files are well known examples. Public and political opinions show a particular black-and-white division. On the one hand there is alarm about the abuse of powers by intelligence services and on the other hand about the possible risks to national security. If we look at the fact finding side of the latter position there appears to be a vacuum. Opinion and not factual or logical proof is dominating the debate at this side. The dogmata of secrecy seem to prohibit such proofs. How can we elevate this debate by obtaining some facts and dependable conclusions in spite of their formal secrecy? In this paper we describe some methods available to perform the research necessary to answer this question and we will start making an inventory of press, political and scientific sources about the Snowden files to be able to estimate the actual as opposed to the alleged security impact of this case of massive leaking of classified information.

References 

[1] American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). NSA Documents.

[2] Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (2016, August 19). Snowden Surveillance Archive.

[3] Courage Foundation & Transparency Toolkit. Snowden Document Search.

[4] Cryptome (2013, September 7). Snowden Tally. Retrieved from

[5] Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). NSA Primary Sources.

[6] NSA Observer. Documents. Retrieved from github.com/nsaobserver/documents/tree/master/files/pdf.

[7] The Intercept (2016, August 10). Snowden Archive. The SIDtoday Files. Retrieved from theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/.

[8] De Telegraaf (2013-2016). www.telegraaf.nl.

[9] Der Spiegel (2013-2016). www.spiegel.de.

[10] The Guardian (2013-2016). www.theguardian.com.

[11] The Intercept (2013-2016). www.theintercept.com.

[12] The Sun (2016). www.thesun.co.uk.

[13] The Washington Post (2013-2016). www.washingtonpost.com.

[14] USA Today (2013-2016). www.usatoday.com.

[15] Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (2010-2013). Inspire Magazine. Al-Malahem Media. Retrieved from publicintelligence.net/?s=inspire.

[16] Berghel, H. (2014). Mr. Snowden’s legacy. Computer, 47(4), pp. 66-70.

[17] Bochel, H., Defty, A., & Kirkpatrick, J. (2014). Watching the watchers: parliament and the intelligence services. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

[18] Castro, D., & McQuinn, A. (2015). Beyond the USA Freedom Act: How U.S. Surveillance Still Subverts U.S. Competitiveness. ITIF, pp. 1-11.

[19] Clark, R.A. et al (2013). Liberty and Security in a Changing World. Report and Recommendations of The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies.

[20] European Parliament (2013). Resolution on the US National Security Agency surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ privacy (2013/2682(RSP)).

[21] Fenster, M. (2012). Disclosure’s effects: WikiLeaks and transparency. Iowa Law Review, 97(3), pp. 753 – 807.

[22] Flashpoint Global Partners (2014). Measuring the Impact of the Snowden Leaks on the Use of Encryption by Online Jihadists.

[23] Goldman, Z.K., & S.J. Rascoff (2016). Global intelligence oversight: governing security in the twenty-first century. New York: Oxford University Press.

[24] Harding, L. (2014). The Snowden Files. The inside story of the world’s most wanted man. London: Guardian Books.

[25] Recorded Future (2014). How Al-Qaeda Uses Encryption Post-Snowden Part 1 and Part 2. The Recorded Future Blog.

[26] Richelson, J.T. (2013). The Snowden Affair. Web Resource Documents the Latest Firestorm over the National Security Agency. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, no. 436.

[27] Shafer, J. (2014). Live and Let Leak State Secrets in the Snowden Era. Foreign Affairs New York, 93(2), pp.136-142.

[28] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2012). The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. New York: United Nations.

[29] Verkaik, R. (2015, January 20). Al Qaeda's YouTube guide for jihadists: Security chiefs spooked over terror video that proves extremists are using leaks from US spy Edward Snowden to evade justice. Daily Mail Online..

[30] de Vey Mestdagh, C.N.J. (2015). De vijf dogma’s van de geheimhoudingsreligie of in welk kabouterland zijn wij nu toch verzeild geraakt? (The international youth science forum “Litteris et artibus”, 23–25 November 2017, Lviv, Ukraine 449 five dogmata of the global religion of secrecy or in what nation of gnomes have we gone astray?). Tijdschrift voor Internetrecht, (4), pp. 148-152.

[31] House of Representatives, USA. Annual reports: 113-310; 113-714; 113-717.

[32] House of Representatives, USA. Reports: 113-39; 113-102; 113-155; 113-277; 113-314; 113-446; 113-452; 113-463; 113-682; 113-719; 114-109 Part 1; 114-321; Majority Staff Report (2013, July 31); The Road to Boston: Counterterrorism Challenges and Lessons from Marathon Bombings (2014); Executive Summary of Review of the Unauthorized Disclosures of Former National Security Agency Contractor Edward Snowden (2016, September 15).

[33] House of Representatives, USA (2013, October 29). Testimonies before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: Baker, S.A.; Bradbury, S.G.

[34] House of Representatives, USA. Transcripts of Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Business Meetings: 2014, February 10; 2014, March 6; 2014, March 13; 2014, May 29; 2014, July 24.

[35] Senate, USA. Hearings: 113-89; 113-600; Statement of Prioletti, B.A. (2013, October 31).

[36] Senate, USA. Preliminary Hearings of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Federal Programs and the Federal Workforce and Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight: 2013, June 20; 2013, November 19; 2013, November 20.

[37] Senate, USA. Reports: 113-7; 113-34; 113-81; 113-111; 113-118; 113-119; 113-120; 113-176; 113-195; 113-288; 113-323; 114-8; 114-33; 114-79; 114-178; 114-246; 114-297; Majority Staff Report of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2014, August 28); Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya (2014, November 21).

[38] Senate, USA. Testimonies before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: Canterbury, A. (2013, November 20); Niehaus, P.J. (2015, May 20); Nojeim, G.T. (2015, January 28); Stern, J. (2016, January 20).

[39] Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC), UK. Annual reports: 2012-2013; 2013-2014; 2015-2016.

[40] Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC), UK. Special reports: Report on Foreign Involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure (2013); Statement by the ISC regarding GCHQ’s alleged access to the US PRISMprogramme (2013) ; Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework (2015).

[41] Intelligence Services Commissioner’s Office, UK. Annual reports: 2013; 2014; 2015.

[42] Interception Of Communications Commissioner’s Office (IOCCO), UK. Annual reports: 2013; 2014; 2015.

[43] Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), UK. Additional report 2011-2015.

[44] National Crime Agency (NCA), UK. Annual reports: 2013-2014; 2014-2015; 2015-2016.

[45] Office of Surveillance Commissioners (OSC), UK. Annual Reports: 2013-2014; 2014-2015; 2015-2016.

[46] Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CIVD), The Netherlands. Annual reports: 2013; 2014. Retrieved from www.officielebekendmakingen.nl.

[47] Defence Intelligence and Security Service (DISS), The Netherlands. Annual reports: 2013; 2014; 2015. Retrieved from www.rijksoverheid.nl.

[48] General Intelligence and Security Service (GISS), The Netherlands. Annual reports: 2013; 2014; 2015. Retrieved from www.aivd.nl.

[49] National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), The Netherlands. Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands (CSAN): 2013; 2014; 2015. Retrieved from www.ncsc.nl/actueel/Cybersecuritybeeld%2BNederland.

[50] National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), The Netherlands. Magazine Nationale Veiligheid en Crisisbeheersing (Magazine for National Security and Crisis Management): 2013(3) – 2016(3). Retrieved from www.nctv.nl.

[51] National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), The Netherlands. Nieuwsbrief Nationaal Crisiscentrum (Newsletter National Crisis Centre): 2013, August – 2016, June.
Retrieved from www.nctv.nl.

[52] Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD), The Netherlands. Annual reports: 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016. Retrieved from www.ctivd.nl.

[53] Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD), The Netherlands. Press releases: 2013-2016. Retrieved from www.ctivd.nl.

[54] Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD), The Netherlands. Supervisory reports: 22b; 37; 38, 39; 42; 47; 48; 49. Retrieved from www.ctivd.nl.