Natural questions for people or businesses that face interval uncertainty in their data when dealing with cooperation are: Which coalitions should form? How to distribute the collective gains or costs? The theory of cooperative interval games is a suitable tool for answering these questions. In this paper, we introduced and characterizated the new interval solutions concepts, i.e. interval CIS-value, interval ENSC-value and interval equal division solution by using cooperative interval games. Finally, we characterizd these interval solutions for two-player games
[1] Alparslan Gök, S.Z., Branzei, R., Tijs, S., 2009.
Convex Interval Games. Journal of Applied
Mathematics and Decision Sciences, Article ID
342089, 14 pages.
INTERNATIONAL YOUTH SCIENCE FORUM “LITTERIS ET ARTIBUS”, 24–26 NOVEMBER 2016, 70 LVIV, UKRAINE
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